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Introduction 
The judiciary has played a central role in Malawian politics since the political 
transition, and in the context of the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections, this 
was more striking than ever. The courts were involved – directly or indirectly – at 
every stage:  
· in the pre-election battles over “the rules of the game” – the legal framework 
and institutional set-up for the elections;  
· in the registration and education of voters and compilation of the voters roll; 
· in the nomination of candidates;  
· in disputes relating to the campaign;  
· in relation to the conduct of the polling process on election day;  
· with regard to the vote count and the integrity of the results; and  
· in the process of converting the electoral mandate into political positions. 
 
In the context of this project 'electoral period' is defined broadly. In line with current 
trends in the international literature we regard that a new electoral period starts 
immediately following the previous election. 1 The figure below indicates how 
elections are continuous processes, with different types of issues typically arising at 
particular stages of the process. Changes in the electoral framework may arise at all 
stages, but are most likely in the early stages of the process. In the immediate post-
election period, the parties tend to be uncertain as to how changes in the rules of the 
electoral game will affect their interests. 
 
Figure 1: The Electoral Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Elklit, J.(1999): “Electoral institutional change and democratization: You can lead a horse to 
water but you can’t make it drink”, Democratization, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 28-51. 
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The role of the judiciary in the 2004 electoral process was played within an 
institutional framework comprising mainly of the Electoral Commission, political 
parties, the Executive and Parliament. The first part of this paper will take you 
through the courts' involvement in the period from pre-election to election and 
immediate post-election. The aim is to show how, within the institutional framework 
of the electoral process, the judiciary has assumed four crucial functions, which we 
will term: accountability function; safety-valve; internal arbiter; and political 
leverage.  
 
A) The Malawian courts have (to a varying extent and with shifting success) 
assumed what is often seen as the primary mandate of the judicial branch in a 
democratic society: namely to “unblock the democratic channels”. 2 We term 
this the  accountability function of the courts. To safeguard the integrity of the 
electoral process is at the core of this accountability function, and the courts 
may do so in various ways: 
· by sanctioning violations of electoral rules and regulations, and the 
broader democratic principles laid down in the constitution; 
· by preventing self-serving alterations of the lega l and institutional 
framework for the elections ;  
· by protecting the rights of actors in political and civil society, and by 
preserving space for them to perform a meaningful role in the electoral 
process. 
The core concern is to prevent those in positions of power from “tilting the 
playing field” and “drawing up ladder”, using their power to manipulate the 
electoral contest. We can thus say that the court acts on their constitutional 
mandate to provide horizontal accountability, in order to enable the mechanisms 
of vertical accountability. 3  
 
The accountability function is traditionally the focus in analyses of the courts’ 
political role in relation to elections, but there are also other functions performed by 
the courts in Malawi that are worth noticing: 
 
B) The courts in Malawi have assumed an important function as a safety valve in the 
political system.  
· They diffuse tension (and avert the use of violence) by providing an 
arena where the parties can fight out heated political battles "by 
proxy", through their lawyers. The cool-off period provided by the 
formalities of the legal process, is central here.  
· Another aspect, or variety of this role, is that it represents a face-saving 
option – it provides a way to let ‘lost’ disputes fizzle out and die in the 
process, outside the public eye. 
 
                                                 
2 Ely, J. H. (1980). Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Cambridge. Mass., Harvard 
University Press. 
3 On the concepts of horizontal and vertical accountability see Schedler, A. et al. (eds.) (1999). The 
self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. Boulder, Colo. and London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers; Mainwaring, S. and C. Welna (eds.) (2003). Democratic accountability in 
Latin America. Oxford, Oxford University Press; on the accountability function of courts specifically 
see Gloppen S. et al (eds.) (2004) Democratization and the Judiciary. The Accountability Function of 
Courts in New Democracies. London, Frank Cass. 
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C) The Malawian courts have increasingly assumed the role of internal arbiter for 
the political parties participating in the electoral contest, in particular on 
disputes related to the selection of candidates for public office. That the courts 
are given such a prominent role in party-internal battles is a recent phenomenon 
in Malawi, and unusual in comparative terms. 
 
D) Lastly, in Malawi, as in many other countries, different actors on the political 
scene use the courts to gain political leverage, or blackmail-potential. This takes 
different forms.  
· ‘Non-political’ cases – typically criminal cases involving allegations of 
fraud, corruption and treason – may be used to discredit political 
opponents, or persuade them into cooperation. (Threatened charges 
may have a similar effect). 
· Similarly, cases directly related to the electoral process may be used as 
bargaining chips. Agreements to drop (or abstain form laying) election 
petitions, may for example be part of negotiations over cabinet 
positions. 
 
We will argue that in the context of Malawian politics, the first two functions are 
particularly crucial. By taking them on, the courts have – beyond any doubt – 
contributed positively to the electoral process. Nevertheless, the growing prominence 
of the courts in the political arena is a cause for concern. The fact that political battles 
to an increasing extent end up in the courts, seems to reflect a lack of trust in the 
political institutions and a weakening of their ability to function as arenas for peaceful 
conflict resolution. It also makes the courts vulnerable; the more major political 
battles are channelled into the legal arena, the more important it becomes to have 
control over the judicial branch. In this context the question is whether the courts can 
sustain a significant accountability function. The Malawian courts have demonstrated 
a considerable degree of independence throughout the election period, but there are 
also some worrying signs.  
 
Before we start examining the performance of the courts in the current electoral 
process, it may be useful to take a brief look at what occured prior to this. In the last 
part of the paper we discuss some of the factors that have enabled the Malawian 
courts to take on such a central political role. 
Judicial politics in Malawi 1993 – 2003 
The Malawian judiciary's political role is of recent origin – at least in the narrow 
sense of adjudicating matters related to the competition for political office. 
Previously, during the subsistence of the colonial and post- independence one party 
state, the judiciary played an important political role only in the broader sense, by 
upholding the dominant economic, social and economic relations of the time. 
However, it was during the political transition that culminated with the adoption of a 
liberal democratic constitutional order in 1994 that it started to take on what we have 
referred to above as an accountability function.  
  4 
The 1993 referendum 
The most significant formal political event of Malawi’s transition from a one-party 
state run by a “Life President” was the National Referendum held on 14 June 1993. 
The referendum question was whether Malawi should become a multiparty state. The 
referendum and the political dynamics surrounding it gave rise to a number of 
disputes whose resolution by the judiciary was indicative of an emerging willingness 
by the judiciary to assert itself in constraining the abuse or excess of power by state 
institutions such as the Independent Referendum Commission, government ministries 
and the police. 
 
The High Court was particularly active in deciding cases arising out of the 
referendum. It was this court that: reversed a decision of the Referendum Commission 
barring members of the army and police from voting;4 constrained the police from 
operating permanent roadblocks;5 from banning certain people from addressing public 
rallies,6 and from barring people in custody from meeting their lawyers without the 
permission of the Inspector General of Police.7 And when Du Chisiza, a popular actor 
who acted in plays that were perceived by the government as campaigning against it 
in the referendum debate, was effectively banned from performing in secondary 
schools, the High Court held that the ban issued by the Minister of Education was an 
abuse of power and, therefore, invalid. 8  
 
The involvement of the High Court in resolving conflicts arising out of the 
referendum was significant in at least two respects. In the first place, the decisions of 
the court enabled various individual stakeholders to enjoy their specific right of being 
able to participate fully in the referendum. Secondly, the decisions had a significant  
impact on the broader legal and institutional framework. In both instances, the courts 
effectively sought to unblock the channels of participation and level the referendum 
playing field, and thus performed a democratic accountability function – in the 
context of a non-democratic regime. 
 
These judgments, decided in the last period of the Banda dispensation, before the 
adoption of the democratic constitution, also shows that if lawyers and judges are 
sufficiently creative in the use of procedural laws, they can circumvent restrictions 
that may undermine accountability. This is how the High Court managed to rely on 
the general unwritten principles of democracy to protect the exercise of key rights 
such as the right to vote, the freedom of expression, the right to freedom of movement 
and the right to legal representation even though the Constitution in force at the time 
provided no explicit guarantees of human rights. 
 
Although the courts in the transition period on important occasions constrained the 
abuse of power, safeguarded human rights and promoted democratic principles, this 
was not always the case. In a number of cases – most notably Chakufwa  Chihana v The 
                                                 
4 Nkhwazi v Referendum Commission Civil Cause No. 96 of 1993. 
5 National Consultative Council v Attorney General , Civil Cause No. 958 of 1994. 
6 Aaron Longwe v Attorney General, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 11 of 1993. 
7 Mhone v Attorney General Civil Cause No. 511 of 1993. 
8 Du Chsiza jnr v Minister of Education Civil Cause no. 10 of 1993. 
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Republic,9 and Muluzi and Thomson v Attorney General,10 – the courts upheld laws that 
undermined the enjoyment of human rights and democratic participation. In both 
cases, the High Court (and in the former case, the Supreme Court of Appeal as well) 
made decisions that did not advance the process of democratisation. The courts 
justified the conservativeness of their decisions on narrow technical grounds, namely 
the technical meaning of the term “sedition”, in the Chihana case and the exemption of 
government from injunctions by the rules of civil procedure. As indicated earlier, the 
High Court had, in most referendum cases, managed to uphold various human rights 
in the absence of explicit guarantees of human rights by appealing to broad principles. 
The failure of the courts in the Chihana and Muluzi & Thomson cases to overcome the 
technical limitations in favour of broad principles of democracy was, therefore, 
probably attributable to political choice rather than conceptual inevitability. 
The 1994 elections 
The courts were also actively involved in the events surrounding the parliamentary 
and presidential elections held in 1994, performing its accountability function by 
enforcing “rules of the game”. The courts performed this function in relation to 
nominations, such as in In Re Nomination of J.J. Chidule in which the High Court held 
that a person qualifies for nomination to contest for a parliamentary seat if he or she is 
registered in any constituency in Malawi, and not necessarily in the constituency in 
which he or she intends to contest.11 An in Malenganzoma v the Electoral Commission, 
the High Court upheld the authority of the Electoral Commission to determine 
whether a prospective parliamentary candidate has the necessary language proficiency 
required by the Constitution.  
 
The courts also enforced the rules of the game at other stages of the electoral process, 
including polling and counting of votes.12 In the aftermath of the elections, when the 
parties were converting their electoral mandate into positions and power, the judiciary 
                                                 
9 Chakufwa Chihana v The Republic, Criminal Appeal No.9 of 1992 involved a charge of sedition 
against the leader of a pressure group that was agitating for the adoption of a multiparty system of 
government. Both the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal held that the accused was guilty as 
charged although he had not advocated violence in his anti-government speeches. The courts chose to 
apply the existing law despite arguments by defence lawyers that the law contravened various 
international human rights s tandards.  
10 In the High Court case of Muluzi and Thomson v Attorney General, Civil Cause No.66 of 1993, the 
plaintiff's claim was for an injunction to restrain the Malawi Police Force from unlawfully stopping 
them from publicising the holding of a public meeting. The court rejected the application for an 
injunction, relying on a provision of the Civil Procedure (Suits by or Against the Government or Public 
Officers) Act (Cap. 6:01) of the Laws of Malawi, providing that: “Nothing in this Act contained shall 
be constituted as authorising grant of relief by way of injunction for specific performance against the 
Government, but in lieu thereof the court may make an order declaratory of the rights of the parties.” 
The case could have been decided differently had the courts and lawyers been as creative as those in 
the earlier mentioned case of Longwe v Attorney General, in which the High Court declared a police 
directive barring certain named individuals from addressing a political campaign meeting to be outside 
the powers of the police. Because the police had no power to issue the ban, their directive was invalid 
and of no effect. In effect, this ordered the police not to proceed with enforcement of the ban and 
produced the same result as would have been obtained using an injunction. 
11 Civil Cause No. 5 of 1995. 
12 Election petitions include Chikweza v The Electoral Commission, Civil Cause no. 1061 of 1994; and 
Phoso v The Electoral Commission Civil Cause No. 1271 of 1996. 
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was also called upon to decide disputes over representation13 and the division of 
powers between the different political bodies.14 
 
The period between 1993 and 1996 should be seen as the time when the judiciary 
established itself as the primary custodian of the values of democracy. During this 
period, the political authority of the judiciary was consolidated by default because 
unlike the executive and parliament which were undergoing radical transformation, 
the judiciary survived the transition intact, with the same personnel and largely the 
same institutional framework. In the lacuna created by the transitional state of the 
executive and parliament, therefore, the judiciary was able to assert and expand its 
authority and power, with little or no resistance from the other branches. 
The 1999 elections 
In comparison to the 1994 elections, the 1999 elections generated more judicial 
intervention both qualitatively and quantitatively. A wider range of institutions 
involved in the electoral process came under judicial scrutiny and the range of issues 
became more varied. In terms of institutions, the Electoral Commission was the object 
of most judicial action. The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal exercised 
their accountability function in relation to the Commission by ordering it to comply 
with a wide range of legal duties related to the electoral process. In a number of cases, 
the courts constrained the Commission from abusing its power. In the politically 
significant cases, the Commission was ordered: 
· to register prisoners as voters;15 
· to accept the nomination papers of a presidential candidate who had chosen to 
contest with a vice-presidential candidate from another party;16  
· to ensure that elections were free and fair; 17 and 
· to set the date of polling in accordance with the Constitution regardless of a 
contrary provision in the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act.18 
 
In all these cases, the courts promoted democracy by enhancing voter participation, 
facilitating “coalitions” among contesting parties by allowing them to contest jointly 
in the presidential election and promoting constitutionalism over the dictates of 
                                                 
13 The High Court upheld the freedom of action of a Member of Parliament over the right of 
constituents to have representation during all debates in the National Assembly (Chakuamba v 
Ching’oma, Civil Cause No. 99 of 1996. 
14 In the case of Mponda Mkandawire v The Attorney General the High Court was called upon to 
interpret the constitutional powers of the President to appoint Ministers. The court leant in favour of an 
expansive interpretation that empowers the President to appoint any person to become a Minister 
without consulting the political party to which he or she belongs. 
15 Phambala v Chairman, Electoral Commission Civil Cause No. 34 of 1999. 
16 Chakuamba and Chihana v The Electoral Commission Civil Cause No. 25 of 1999. The facts of the 
case were that the two plaintiffs were the presidents of the Malawi Congress Party and the Alliance for 
Democracy political parties respectively. In the run up to the 1999 presidential elections, the two 
parties had formed an electoral alliance, one of whose terms was that the plaintiffs would contest the 
elections as presidential and vice presidential candidates respectively. A few months before the 
elections, The Electoral Commission ruled that the plaintiffs could not contest the presidential election 
on the same ticket, as this would breach statutory provisions regulating permissible electoral symbols. 
The plaintiffs successfully petitioned the High Court for a declaration that the ruling of the Electoral 
Commission was wrong in law. 
17 Khembo v Electoral Commission, Civil Cause No. 70 of 1999.   
18 Mungomo v Electoral Commission, Civil Application No. 23 of 1999. 
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statutory electoral laws. The fact that the decisions were made against the Electoral 
Commission, however, had the potential of adversely affecting the relationship  
between the Commission and the courts, with the Commission feeling that the latter 
was usurping its authority to set standards for the conduct of the elections.  
 
To be fair though, the courts did not question the Commission’s authority in all cases. 
On at least two occasions, the High Court upheld decisions of the Commission: In the 
case of The Attorney General v Chakuamba, Kalua and Mnkhumbwe in which the results 
of the presidential election were challenged by most of the candidates who had 
contested in it, the courts upheld the Commission’s pre-eminent authority to conduct 
elections. The High Court reiterated this view in the case of Kafumba v Electoral 
Commission,19 in which it held that the Electoral Commission had the primary 
authority to handle complaints related to the elections and that a complaint related to 
elections cannot be lodged with the courts unless it had first been made to the 
Commission.  
 
Another institution that came under jud icial scrutiny in the 1999 election period was 
Parliament. In the period between 1994 and 1999, the relationship between the courts 
and Parliament was shaped through cases questioning the extent to which the courts 
could legitimately “interfere” with decisions made by Parliament, which was 
authorised by the Constitution to regulate its own procedure. In the only case that the 
High Court has decided on political party funding, the court took an interventionist 
approach and reversed a parliamentary decision suspending the disbursement of 
funding to the Malawi Congress Party which was boycotting parliamentary sittings in 
protest against what the party considered to be unprocedural conduct of business by 
Parliament.20 The court held that Parliament’s constitutional duty to disburse funding 
to parties that had won at least 10% of the vote at the last national election could not 
be abrogated by the National Assembly, even during a period in which the party was 
boycotting sittings of the Assembly. The courts were, however, not consistent in their 
willingness to intervene in “internal” affairs of Parliament. For example, in the case of 
The State v the Electoral Commission, ex. p. Chakuamba, the High Court declined to deal 
with a complaint of a Member of Parliament regarding action taken by the Speaker in 
the National Assembly on the ground that the Constitution gives the Speaker 
immunity. 21  
 
In addition to the Electoral Commission and Parliament, the Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation also found itself the subject of judic ial action in relation to the election. 
In the case of Kafumba v Electoral Commission and Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation, the High Court ordered the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation to give 
balanced coverage of campaign activities of both the ruling party and the opposition. 22 
 
As a general assessment the judiciary performed its accountability function 
reasonably well in this period. Although there were clear deficiencies in the way the 
1999 elections were conducted, the courts contributed positively to the integrity of 
                                                 
19 Civil Cause No. 30 of 1999. 
20 Attorney General v Masauli Civil Appeal No. 28 of 1998. 
21 Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 68 of 2000. The judge noted with concern that the decision of the 
Speaker to suspend a Member of Parliament adversely affected the interests of the MP’s constituents, 
but nevertheless, upheld the immunity of the Speaker from having that decision judicially reviewed. 
22 Civil Cause No. 30 of 1999. 
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electoral process.23 This was helped by the fact that, in general, the government and 
other institutions complied with adverse judgments. A notable exception was the 
Kafumba case where the High Court ordered the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation to 
give a balanced coverage of campaign activities. As we shall see in relation to the 
discussion of the 2004 elections, the MBC has continued to defy the principle laid 
down by the court in Kafumba (and the laws on which it was based) as it routinely 
covered ruling party campaign functions, while excluding those of the opposition. 24  
 
Compared to the 1994 electoral process, the 1999 elections the results were to a 
greater extent disputed – including the presidential election – and what we have 
referred to as the safety valve function of the courts became more prominent.  
The Malawian Judiciary in the context of the 2004 elections  
As noted in the introduction, the courts were centrally involved throughout the most 
recent electoral process in Malawi. This include cases regarding the electoral rules 
and framework for administration of the elections ; regarding the voter registration 
process; candidate selection; the electoral campaign; the polling process; the counting 
of votes and the integrity of the results, and cases regarding the distribution of 
positions and privileges on the basis of the election results. As indicated in figure 1, 
these categories of cases represent different  stages in the electoral process. Although 
in practice cases from various categories may overlap in time, this reflects the logical 
sequence of the electoral process, and in the following we use it to structure the 
discussion.  
Cases regarding the legal framework for the elections 
A framework of laws and rules to govern elections is a fundamental requirement in a 
democratic political system. Interpreting these laws and rules and applying them in 
concrete cases is the constitutional preserve of the judiciary. It is the judiciary, 
therefore, that ultimately decides the meaning of various laws and rules, and the 
meaning that the judiciary accords to the laws and rules may promote or hinder the 
democratic process. The framework for the administration of elections is a basic 
aspect of the political system and may be contested at any time during the electoral 
cycle. It is therefore necessary to examine judicial action involving matters that arise 
even before the commencement of what is normally regarded as the election period.  
 
In the context of the 2004 elections, the High Court made a number of decisions that 
related directly or indirectly to laws and rules governing various aspects of the 
elections, including the eligibility of presidential candidates; “crossing of the floor” 
by MPs elected on party tickets; and the necessary qualifications for the Chairperson 
of the Electoral Commission. 
 
                                                 
23 This assessment is echoed by several observers, see for example Martin Ott et al. (eds) (2000). 
Malawi's second democratic elections : process, problems and prospects. Blantyre, Malawi: Christian 
Literature Association in Malawi; Clement Ng’ong’ola (2001), “Judicial Mediation in Electoral Politics 
in Malawi” in Harry Englund (ed) A Democracy of Chamelions, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp 
62-86. … 
24This has attracted much protest from donors such as the European Union, civil society organisations 
such as the Public Affairs Committee and opposition parties. 
  9 
Since the 2004 election period commenced (at the end of the 1999 elections), three 
factors dominated the political discourse and activity. The first was the campaign for 
an extension of the term of office of the President beyond the maximum two 
consecutive terms stipulated by the Constitution. The second was the capacity of the 
Electoral Commission to conduct free and fair elections, while the third was the role 
of civil society organisations in the electoral process. The judiciary played a 
significant role in all three areas. In a number of cases, the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal enforced the principle of accountability, resolved disputes 
and provided a safety-valve for venting political frustration. In other cases, parties 
used the courts to gain political leverage. 
 
One of the most significant political developments during the early part of the 2004 
electoral period was the attempt by the United Democratic Front to secure an 
amendment of the Constitution in order to allow presidents to be in office indefinitely 
or for a maximum of three consecutive terms. Some sections of the public planned to 
stage protests but the President banned demonstrations for or against the proposal. 
The ban was challenged in the High Court which eventually ruled that the ban was 
unconstitutional. This decision, among other things, created the space within which 
the constitutional framework governing elections could gain legitimacy through free 
debate in all forms, including assemblies and demonstrations. The action of the court 
in this case had a positive effect on the participatory quality of the political process 
leading up to the 2004 elections. and arguably contributed to democratic 
consolidation.  
 
The case was probably one of the most significant of the 2004 elections for the 
additional reason that it was one of the exceptional cases in which the courts 
articulated explicitly the broad democratic principles that underlay the framework of 
rules for the elections. The court went beyond merely stating that the President’s ban 
was contrary to section of the Constitution that guarantees every person the right to 
freedom of assembly and demonstration. It conceptualised the protecion and 
enforcement of specific human rights, as a means to the higher-level objective of 
democracy. In response to the argument that the ban was necessary to maintain order, 
even if this was at the expense of some freedoms, the court stated as follows:  
 
Every Malawian who is mature enough will remember that for 30 
years, this country “enjoyed” peace and quiet, law and order that 
was devoid of the rights and freedoms and the social justice now 
enshrined in our Constitution. Taking judicial notice of the cases 
brought before this Court and the events in our National Assembly, 
very few Malawians want that kind of peace and quiet, law and 
order. 
 
In assessing the significance of this case, it is important to acknowledge the few other 
cases that linked specific legal rules within the framework of elections to broader 
political issues. In the 1999 election period, the High Court had unpacked a technical 
argument by lawyers of both sides in the case of Chakuamba and Chihana v Electoral 
Commission and identified the central contentious issue in the case to be the existence 
of an alliance between the Malawi Congress Party and the Alliance for Democracy. 
Similar candidness by the courts on the broader political implications of their 
decisions was also apparent in the case of Chupa v Mayor of City of Blantyre. This case 
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involved a purported ban of a public rally by the Mayor of Blantyre and the police. In 
overturning the purported ban, the High Court defined the balancing process between 
the needs of the right to assemble and demonstrate and those of public order as not 
only a legal but also a political one. 
 
In connection with the 2004 elections, the courts also performed an accountability 
function vis-à-vis Parliament. The courts decided a number of cases involving the part 
of the regulatory and administrative framework that governs the translation of votes 
into seats in Parliament. In these cases, decisions of the High Court and Supreme 
Court of Appeal helped to define the relationship of the courts to Parliament. In one 
group of cases, the two courts defined the relationship as one of co-equal branches of 
government whose powers were separate and independent from each other. In the 
other group of cases, the courts adopted a more interventionist role for the judiciary, 
assigning to it powers of oversight over Parliament.  
 
One issue that emerged as a major subject of judicial interaction with Parliament was 
that of “crossing the floor” by Members of Parliament. The critical importance of the 
legal and administrative framework of elections motivates contesting parties to seek 
control over the law-making and administrative machinery of the state. Since 1994, 
section 65 of the Constitution has provided parliamentary parties the instrument with 
which they have tried to re-shape the balance of power in the National Assembly after 
elections. The section empowers the Speaker of Parliament to declare vacant the seat 
of any Member of Parliament who have “crossed the floor” by voluntarily resigning 
from the party that sponsored him or her during the elections or joining an 
organisation or association that is political in nature.  
 
The courts have decided numerous cases relating to this provision since 1994, and in 
all but one of these cases the MPs in question obtained injunctions which were not 
challenged by the Speaker and retained their seats. (Only in the case of Nseula v 
Attorney General did the court uphold the decision of the Speaker to declare a seat 
vacant). In the vast majority of cases, the High Court practically overruled decisions 
made by Parliament and ordered the reinstatement of the members whose seats had 
been declared vacant. The decisions  served to preserve space for the opposition, and 
restricted the ability of the United Democratic Front who had the largest number of 
Members of Parliament to use its numerical dominance to force through charges of 
“crossing the floor” against opposition Members of Parliament or rebellious members 
of their own party. The issuing of judicial injunctions against almost all the attempts 
to declare various seats vacant served the interests of democratisation by preventing 
arbitrary alterations of the parliamentary balance.  
 
It was also in the numerous “crossing the floor cases” that the judiciary sought to 
define its proper relationship with Parliament. In the landmark Nseula case, the High 
Court took the view that notwithstanding the traditional immunity of Parliament and 
its constitutional power to regulate its own procedure, courts may intervene and 
review its decisions. According the Supreme Court of Appeal in that case, 
declarations of vacant seats by the Speaker under section 65 of the Constitution 
involves constitutional interpretation and “ neither [the Speaker] nor the National 
Assembly itself can extend parliamentary privilege to the interpretation of the 
fundamental law of the country which is and must remain the constitutional 
responsibility of courts”. This position, therefore, meant that the courts became the 
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final arbiters in the battles to re-shape the balance of power in Parliament. Using this 
power, the courts largely prevented the alteration of the balance in almost all cases in 
which there were attempts to do so and preserved the balance as determined at the 
ballot box in the 1999 elections. 
 
The preservation of the balance of power in Parliament was not the only consequence 
of judicial intervention in respect of section 65 of the Constitution. In another 
landmark case decided in 2002, Public Affairs Committee v Attorney General, the courts 
upheld the right of Members of Parliament to freely associate with civil society 
groups in political advocacy campaigns. They declared that an amendment to section 
65 that purported to effectively bar MPs from joining associations or organisations 
that were political in nature was unconstitutional because it unduly restricted freedom 
of association and other human rights of MPs. Apart from reiterating the censorial 
power of the courts over Parliament, the decision also affected the course of the 2004 
elections because it allowed MPs who opposed the bid for an extension of presidential 
terms of office to join the campaign against the proposed extension which was 
mounted by NGOs such as the Forum for the Defence of the Constitution (FDC).  
 
This decision promoted the principle that the legal framework regulating the 
relationship between voters and their representatives, and the actions of 
parliamentarians, must respect constitutional provisions, in this case the right to 
freedom of association. The judiciary also unblocked the democratic process by 
permitting MPs more freedom to associa te with civil society groups without being 
held to violate (unduly restrictive) laws governing the conditions of parliamentary 
representation. In this case, the court also acted as a safety valve by diverting the 
political contests underlying the declarations of vacant seats away from the more 
volatile arena of the National Assembly to the more sedate judicial process.  
 
The only other significant case that directly involved electoral regulations and 
administration was one that that centered on the composition of the Electoral 
Commission, the body responsible for administering elections in the country.25 The 
central question in the case was whether a Supreme Court Judge is qualified to be 
appointed to chair the Commission since the constitutional provision that establishes 
the Commission states that the chairperson of the Commission must be a “judge”. The 
application was brought by one of the contesting parties in the election whose interest 
in the case was not as narrow as the charge suggested. The party was in fact using the 
judicial process to disqualify the incumbent Chairman of the Electoral Commission 
whom they, and other opposition parties and civil society organisations, perceived to 
be biased in favour of the ruling United Democratic Front. One could argue that there 
are substantial reasons why the Election Commission Chair should not simultaneously 
sit on the body which is the ultimate authority on disputes regarding the conduct of 
the commission. The case was, however, argued purely along semantic lines, relying 
on the legal meaning of the word “judge” as distinguished from “justice of the 
Supreme Court”. The court held that the word judge includes a Supreme Court justice. 
But although the party lost the case, and the court maintained the status quo in the 
structure of the Commission, the case nevertheless succeeded in drawing public 
attention to the alleged general unfitness of the Chairperson to head the Commission, 
                                                 
25 Sabwera and People’s Progressive Movement v Attorney General, Constitutional Case No. 1 of 
2004.  
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and therefore served the political interests of the political opposition which had 
initiated the suit. 
 
In summary, it may be noted that the judiciary affected the integrity of electoral rules 
by expanding the space for public debate over the constitutional limitations on the 
eligibility of the President to contest for successive terms of office. In addition the 
courts provided a platform for voicing criticism of the unfairness of the Electoral 
Commission, although the criticism did not lead to any re-organisation of the 
Commission or its legislative framework.  
Voter registration process 
During the voter registration stage of the elections, the courts performed a number of 
functions, including applying penal aspects of the electoral law on voter registration 
and compelling the Electoral Commission to provide sufficient opportunity to 
stakeholders to inspect the voters’ roll. An example of the application of penal 
provisions occurred in a case in which a person was sentenced by a Magistrate for 
registering twice26. It was, however, in connection with the inspection of the voters’ 
roll that the role of the courts had more far-reaching consequences for the electoral 
process as a whole. In the week leading up to polling day, a number of political 
parties and NGOs petitioned the High Court on the grounds that the Electoral 
Commission had failed to run an efficient registration of voters and had not permitted 
enough time for the inspection of the voters’ roll. The High Court ruled that the 
polling day for the presidential and parliamentary elections be postponed for any 
period up to seven days to give the opposition parties and other stakeholders a chance 
to inspect and verify the voter’s roll.27  
 
By postponing the election date, the High Court not only required the Electoral 
Commission to be accountable, but also provided a safety-valve for the release of the 
frustration that several actors in the electoral process had experienced during the 
registration process itself. The judicial order for transparency of the voters’ roll 
provided an opportunity for people to allay their anxieties over the integrity of the 
registration process, thereby preventing the consequences of un-vented frustration. In 
this sense, the courts made a positive contribution to the peacefulness of the elections 
and played a safety-valve function in addition to the accountability one. 
 
In some cases, the mere prospect of judicial action appeared to have affected the 
conduct of institutions such as the Electoral Commission. At some point during the 
process, for example, a number of non-governmental organisations threatened to take 
the Commission to court for not allowing people in some areas sufficient time to 
register. The Commission accommodated the demands by extending the period for 
registration to compensate for the delays that it had caused. It is likely that the 
prospect of legal action played a part in the Commission’s decision. The latent 
authority of the courts was, therefore, used to secure accountability on the part of the 
Commission and promote democracy by providing voters ample opportunity to 
register in order to vote. 
 
                                                 
26 The Republic v Chikhadwe and Chikhadwe (First Magistrates Court, Lilongwe Case No. 
LL/CR/60/1/2004.  
27 Weekend Nation 15-16th May. 
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The authority of the courts and their potential to contribute positively to the electoral 
process can, however, be undermined by the reluctance of other institutions to comply 
with the letter and spirit of court judgments. The case involving the postponement of 
the elections is the best illustration of this point. The Electoral Commission had 
opposed the application for a postponement of the elections that the court eventually 
ordered. When the court ordered the postponement for a maximum of seven days to 
allow sufficient time for the inspection of the voters’ roll, the Commission only 
postponed polling for two days. The shortness of the postponement did not provide 
stakeholders the maximum time that the High Court order had allowed.  
 
The Commission did not state a justification for postponing polling for only two days 
and its decision limited the effectiveness of the High Court order in ensuring 
transparency of voter registration. The Constitution in fact allowed the court to 
postpone the elections for a maximum of seven days. In the case under discussion, 
therefore, the High Court order could have ensured maximum transparency by 
postponing the elections for seven days, effectively setting polling day on 25 May. 
Instead the court chose to leave the final determination to the Electoral Commission 
in the belief that it had the discretionary power to do so and would exercise it 
reasonably bearing in mind the need for sufficient time for inspection of the voters’ 
roll. While the decision is illustrative of the judiciary’s recognition of the authority of 
the Electoral Commission, it also indicates that judicial restraint may permit abuses or 
abdication of discretionary power at the expense of democratic principles.  
Candidate selection  
The selection of candidates for the 2004 elections generated by far a bigger volume of 
cases that were brought before the courts than any other stage of the electoral process. 
The impact of the judicial decisions in the cases had both a historical and institutional 
significance. From the historical perspective, the elections of 2004 were the first in 
which disputes involving candidate selection within political parties came up for 
judicial resolution. From the point of view of the institutional framework of the 
elections, the cases represent the most intrusive exercise of judicial power in 
Malawian elections, in the sense that the courts intervened to set standards for the 
conduct of the internal affairs of political parties.  
 
Judicial action in the candidate selection phase was commenced by members of the 
United Democratic Front (U.D.F.), the Malawi Congress party (M.C.P.) and National 
Democratic Alliance (N.D.A.) against their respective parties. Typically, the cases 
involved complaints about the unfairness of the candidate selection processes. 
Candidates who took their parties to court over irregularities in their party primary 
elections included the following: 
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CANDIDATE CONSTITUENCY PARTY 
Symon Bwanali Balaka North UDF 
Symon Bwanali28 Balaka North UDF 
Weston Kanjira Balaka West UDF 
David Banda29 Blantyre Malabada UDF 
Benedicto Nyirenda Blantyre Malabada UDF 
Clement Khembo ChikwawaEast UDF 
Lewis Kadammanja30 Chiradzulu North UDF 
Rosemary Lapukeni31 Mchinji South West UDF 
Ludoviko Shati32 Mchinji West UDF 
Wilson Ndomondo33 Zomba UDF 
Kadzongwe34  MCP 
Adden Mbowani35  MCP 
Kumachenga 36  MCP 
Fanwell Kwanjana 37 Lilongwe East MCP 
Jossy Nthani38 Mchinji West MCP 
Jodder Kanjere39 Ntcheu North East MCP 
Steve Tchauya 40 Lilongwe North West NDA 
Source: Transcripts of court High Court records. 
  
The evidence gathered from the cases and interviews with various key informants 
indicated that intra-party electoral disputes were often taken to the courts because the 
parties tended to lack effective internal dispute resolution mechanisms. The broad 
constitutional mandate of courts facilitated the tendency towards taking intra-party 
disputes to the courts for resolution, because it made the judiciary receptive to 
political disputes, including those involving internal matters of political parties. Even 
if parties had internal dispute resolution mechanisms, the judiciary was more 
attractive than the internal mechanisms because it commands considerable public trust 
and confidence.  
 
Although the courts were quite willing to intervene in the intra-party disputes relating 
to candidate selection, there was evidence that, to some extent, the judiciary would 
rather have such disputes settled internally by the parties themselves. This was stated 
by Justice Nyirenda in the case of Fanwell Kwanjana v Malawi Congress Party, a 
                                                 
28 Civil Cause No. 429 of 2004. 
29 Civil Application No. 22 of 2004. 
30 Kadammanja v Shati and United Democratic Front Civil Cause No. 305 of 2004. 
31 Lapukeni v Katsonga and United Democratic Front Civil Cause No. 436 of 2004. 
32 Shati v United Democratic Front Civil Cause No. 485 of 2004. 
33 Civil Cause No. 484 of 2004. 
34 Kadzongwe v Malawi Electoral Commission Civil Cause No 13 of 2004. 
35 In Re Adden Mbowani Civil Cause No.15 of 2004. 
36 Kumachenga v Majoni and Malawi Electoral Commission Civil Cause No 18 of 2004. 
37 Fanwell Kwanjana v MCP & E. Mwale Civil Cause No. 143 of 2004.  
38 Nthani v Regional Elections Coordinator (MCP) et. al. Civil Cause No 140 of 2004. 
39 Kanjere v Malawi Congress Party and Kakhome, Civil Cause No. 520 of 2004. 
40 of Steven Maliko Tchauya v Rose Miriam Matchaya & National Democratic Alliance [Civil Cause 
No. 176 of 2004]. 
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position that he also adopted in the Tchauya case, in which he stated that: “… let me 
reiterate what I said in the case of Edmington Kwanjana v MCP & E. Mwale , Civil Cause 
No. 1432 of 2004 that matters like these are best resolved by the political clubs 
themselves. The instant case is typical of such cases that require the intervention of 
party authorities especially owing to time constraints that surround the cases…” The 
court’s preference that political parties should settle their internal disputes without 
resorting to the courts had also been stated in earlier cases which revolved around the 
long-running contest for the leadership of the Malawi Congress Party between Messrs 
Gwanda Chakuamba and John Tembo.41 
 
Despite the restraint expressed in some cases, the judiciary generally engaged in 
resolving intra-party disputes over various aspects of the parties’ primaries. The 
ambivalence towards involvement in intra-party matters was also pronounced in 
interviews conducted with members of the judiciary. On the positive side, a number 
of judges pointed to the trust gained in this process “all the parties come to the courts 
– even where they didn’t trust each other, they trusted the courts”. However, other 
judges feared that the courts would loose credibility in the long run by “jumping in”, 
without a clear legal framework “to solve matters that are political in nature that we 
are not equipped by training or skills to do”; others were concerned that if the process 
continues, the courts would be overwhelmed next time around. All seemed to agree 
that “at the time there is nowhere else to go”, due to the weakness or absence of other 
institutions for party- internal dispute resolution – the alternative would in many cases 
be violence.42  
 
What is clear, is that this type of court intervention represented a historic change. It 
was the first time for the judiciary to intervene at this stage of the electoral process. In 
the 1994 and 1999 elections, the judiciary intervened mainly after polling when 
election petitions were presented to it, and were not called upon to resolve disputes 
arising out of the candidate selection process. It was also the first time that the courts 
intervened so intrusively to regulate the “internal affairs” of a critical institution in the 
electoral process. From the perspective of the parties themselves, this was the first 
time that their respective hierarchies were challenged by their members so 
extensively. 
 
The standard-setting by the judiciary in the candidate-selection phase contributed 
positively to the electoral process by extending the requirement of accountability and 
transparency from state institutions to political parties. Judicial intervention also 
served to diffuse the tension that the primary elections generated among supporters of 
competing candidates, thereby, providing a much-needed safety valve that minimised 
the possibility of violence and disorder.  
 
The positive impact of the judicial intervention at the candidate-selection phase has to 
be weighed against the (possible) negative consequences of the degree of intrusion 
that the cases represented, including increased politicisation of the courts.  
 
                                                 
41 In Re Constitution of Malawi Congress Party and Re a Convention and Part 4 Article 40 of the 
Constitution of the Malawi Congress Party Civil Cause No. 645 of 2001 and Chiwona v Chakuamba 
Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2000. 
42 Autors’ interviews with members of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court in Blantyre 
and Lilongwe in February and July 2004. 
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These cases are also indicative of a striking trend in Malawi, namely the growing 
commercialisation of politics. With the increasing economic importance of political 
office, the contest over positions has heated up. Party nominations are the first, and in 
constituencies regarded as party strongholds, the most crucial stage for candidates 
aiming for political office. Particularly in the more economically developed 
constituencies, candidates invest substantial funds in the party primaries – and when 
they loose they come to the courts to recover their costs.43 Some of the litigants 
claiming to have lost in unfair primaries, explicitly asked to be compensated for the 
resources that had spent in their campaigns, using the judicial process as political 
leverage.  
The campaign 
A critical phase of the 2004 electoral process was the campaign period. The main 
question that featured in the various judicial disputes that arose during this phase was 
the ability and willingness of the Electoral Commission and a number of other 
relevant institutions to facilitate the fairness of the elections. In this connection High 
Court intervention was sought on a number of matters: 
Access to media 
Historically, contestants in Malawian elections have always competed fiercely for 
access to public media. This contestation has inevitably drawn a broad spectrum of 
institutions into the discourse and provided them with the opportunity to define their 
interrelationships. For the judiciary, the debate over access to media involved the 
relationships between the courts, on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission and 
the media, on the other. As has been indicated earlier in this paper, the relationship 
between the courts and the Electoral Commission is one in which the latter is subject 
to the review of the power of the former.  
 
The landmark case in this area arose in the context of the 1999 elections and was that 
of Kafumba v Electoral Commission and Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, Matter No. 35 
of 1999. It held that the publicly-funded Malawi Broadcasting Corporation was guilty 
of bias in its radio coverage of the 1999 elections by giving the ruling party the 
opportunity to campaign on the corporation’s radio stations while denying the 
opposition similar access. Despite that ruling, however, in the context of the 2004 
elections, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation appeared defiant of the Kafumba 
principle (and all the laws on which it was based) and routinely covered ruling party 
campaign functions, while excluding those of the opposition. 44 In reaction, one of the 
country’s most active NGOs, The Public Affairs Committee (PAC), commenced legal 
action in the High Court requesting it to declare that the Electoral Commission and 
the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation had failed in its legal duties by failing to grant 
equal access to the publicly-funded Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) radio.45 
Before the case was argued, though, PAC withdrew ostensibly because the  opposition 
                                                 
43 This also explains why the nomination cases almost exclusively come in the Central and Southern 
regions, rather than in the North, and why they arise predominantly in the ruling party (UDF), where 
the stakes are highest. Court cases are also predominantly found within parties that conduct primary 
elections, rather than appoint candidates through pary conventions.  
44This has attracted much protest from donors such as the European Union, civil society organisations 
such as the Public Affairs Committee and opposition parties. 
45 The Daily Times , March 12, 2004. 
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party, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) also commenced its own case on the 
same grounds against not only MBC but also including Television Malawi (TVM) 
which is also publicly-funded.46  
 
The case of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) v Electoral Commission, MBC and 
TVM,47was significant in at least three respects. Firstly, the judges in this case differed 
with the judgment in the Kafumba case regarding the relationship between the courts 
and the Electoral Commission. It will be recalled that in Kafumba, the High Court held 
that the Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over electoral complaints. In 
contrast, the judges in the National Democratic Alliance case took the following 
position: 
 
“.. We wish to reiterate our disagreement in our April 30th ruling 
with the procedure the Court adopted in the initial filing of the 
Kafumba case, of making the lodging of a written complaint with the 
Electoral Commission a precondition for commencing an action in 
the High Court. We took the view and still stand by it that, 
empowered as this Court is, under clear constitutional provisions … 
we will not allow litigants, on matters concerning the violation of 
fundamental rights, to be blocked from accessing justice in this 
manner. 
 
Secondly, the applicants lost the case mainly because they did not submit sufficient 
admissible evidence to the support their case. Unlike the position in 1999 when the 
Kafumba case was decided, in 2004, there were systematic media monitoring reports 
prepared by the Media Monitoring Unit on behalf of the Electoral Commission 
showing the bias of MBC and TVM.48 Despite the availability of such evidence, the 
complainants surprisingly failed to follow the correct procedure of submitting such 
evidence by calling witnesses who would formally present the reports and the original 
evidence on which they were based. Instead, the complainants only submitted the 
reports in their affidavits, which was insufficient because, in legal terms, their 
deponents were then making allegations without proof and were basing their 
statements on their belief and not knowledge.  
 
The third significant feature of the case was its timing. MBC and TVM had displayed 
bias in the early stages of the 2004 election period and had continued to do so 
throughout the entire period. Yet, it was only two months before polling day that the 
Public Affairs Committee (PAC) sought judicial intervention on the matter, and one 
month to go when the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) lodged its case. Why so 
late, given that the time factor is crucial in order for the judgment to have an impact 
on the campaign? Several factors are relevant to understand this. Firstly, there was an 
understanding that to lodge a case prior to the official 60 days campaign period would 
                                                 
46 The Nation, 21 April, 2004. 
47 Constitutional Cause No.3 of 2004. 
48 The bias in reporting was extreme, in some of the reported periods Malawi Broadcasting Corporation 
and Television Malaw gave the ruling coalition 100% positive coverage while ignoring the opposition. 
(see Mabwuto Banda, “MBC, TVM covered UDF only – Report” Malawi Nation 2/23/2004 at 
http://www.nationmalawi.com.  
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be premature.49 Secondly PAC, who originally lodged the case in mid March, at the 
beginning of the campaign period, for strategic reasons decided to vacate it and leave 
the litigation to the NDA. 50 This also explains why the NDA case was rushed in a way 
that the end proved unsuccessful. And thirdly, it emerged from interviews with key 
informants that there was a lack of confidence in the ability of judicial 
pronouncements to change the biased coverage of MBC and TVM. This was based on 
the experience that even after the 1999 Kafumba judgment MBC virtually ignored the 
court’s judgment and proceeded to broadcast in its usual biased manner for the 
following five years In this regard, the judiciary was, therefore, viewed as having 
minimal impact in ensuring accountability of the MBC during this period and no 
impact on the fairness of the 2004 elections in so far as this depended on fair media 
coverage, particularly by the state-sponsored radio stations.  
 
The courts were also asked to ensure accountability in other aspects of the campaign, 
such as the use of government resources by the UDF for its campaigning purposes. 
This case was brought by the Republican Party acting for Mgwirizano against the 
Malawi Electoral Commission, the UDF and the Attorney General. The complaint 
was based on the UDF’s alleged abuse of public resources for partisan campaign 
purposes and the Commission’s failure to control the UDF in this regard. In the event, 
neither the prospect nor actual commencement of the judicial proceedings appears to 
have had any impact on the conduct of the UDF on the ground. There was no obvious 
change in the use of public resources for party campaigns. The judiciary, therefore, 
had little practical impact on the fairness of the electoral process in this regard. 
 
On the other hand, the judiciary appears to have had some impact on the 
accountability of authorities that regulate public demonstrations. In the case of Chupa 
v Mayor of the City of Blantyre and others51, which was decided in 2001, the plaintiff had 
successfully applied to the High Court for an order stopping the defendants, including 
the police, from effecting a ban on a public meeting that the plaintiff and his political 
pressure group intended to hold. When the mayor and police ignored the court order 
and disrupted the rally, they were convicted of contempt of court in a subsequent 
High Court hearing. This probably explained why when the opposition Mgwirizano 
coalition sought to hold a rally that the authorities did not approve of, the mayor and 
the police officers who had been involved in the Chupa case did not participate in 
disrupting it. And why, after initial attempts by other officials and para-military police 
officers to halt the rally, it was allowed to proceed when the organisers obtained a 
court injunction against the police and the City authorities.52 In both cases, the judicial 
proceedings also served as a safetyvalve for tensions that might otherwise have 
                                                 
49 Autors’ personal communication with Ralph Kasambara ,who handled the case for the PAC, 
February 2004. The view reflects the lack of clarity in the legislative framework in Malawi as to who is 
responsible for ensuring fair coverage of election related matters prior to the campaign period, when 
this falls within the responsibility of the Electoral Commission. Otherwise MACRA is the regulatory 
body for the media, but their mandate in these matters is disputed.  
50 After PAC had lodged the case, there had been signals indicating that the Supreme Court might 
tighten the position on standing, which had recently been relaxed by the High Court in a landmark 
judgment ….). PAC thus feared being thrown out of court on procedural ground, as lacking an interest 
in the case, which would prevent a decision in time for the election, Since the NDA, as a political party 
had a clearer standing, they ‘took over’ the matter, (Authors’ communication with PAC 
representatives, Lilongwe, July 2004). 
51 Civil Cause No. 133 of 2001. 
52 Daily Times : March 12, 2004). 
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erupted into violence. The crowds gathered for the rallies were assured that the 
matters were being handled by the courts and this calmed them. The safetyvalve 
function was, of course, in addition to the accountability function whereby the courts 
required accountability from institutions responsible for regulating public order such 
as the police and City Assemblies. 
 
During the election period a number of cases that came up before the courts were not 
explicitly related to the electoral process although in essence they were. The notable 
ones in this regard included the criminal case against opposition politician Gwanda 
Chakuamba in which he was being prosecuted for allegedly forging the President’s 
signature and the case brought against the same Chakuamba by the Malawi Congress 
Party which sought to evict him from a Malawi Congress Party house soon after he 
had resigned from the party and formed his the Republican party. Arguably, in these 
cases, the government and the Malawi Congress Party were using the judiciary to gain 
political leverage against Chakuamba.  
The polling process, counting of votes and the integrity of the results 
The process of polling, counting and announcing the results of an election can be the 
most controversial of all stages of the electoral process. This was true in the case of 
the 2004 elections in Malawi.  While there was general agreement that polling went on 
peacefully, the process of acquisition of ballot papers and keeping custody of them 
proved to be controversial. It emerged that the Electoral Commission had ordered 
more ballot papers than the number of registered voters. Some stakeholders expressed 
the fear that the extra ballot papers would be used for rigging the result of the 
elections. The matter came up for judicial consideration in the case in which 
opposition parties applied to have the elections postponed to allow sufficient time for 
verification of the voters roll. The additional decision of the High Court in that case 
was that the Commission should surrender any ballot papers in excess of the number 
of registered voters to the court which would keep them in its custody.  
 
On a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal lodged by the Commission, 
the order related to custody of excess ballot papers was reversed because in the view 
of the Supreme Court, the Commission was the only institution that was mandated to 
administer elections and keep custody of election materials. This decision of the 
Supreme Court had some negative impact on public confidence in the integrity of the 
electoral process. Opposition parties and several NGOs had expressed the suspicion 
that the extra ballot papers had been deliberately imported by the Commission for 
purposes of rigging the elections. The court’s decision to entrust the excess ballot 
papers to the Commission was, therefore seen by some as creating an opportunity for 
the Commission to do such rigging. Had the High Court decision stood, it would have 
fundamentally changed the institutional framework of the elections in Malawi by 
giving the judiciary a direct role in the administration of elections. This would have 
made jurisdictional conflicts between the judiciary and the Electoral Commission 
likely. In the event, the Supreme Court’s decision averted this by underscoring the 
Commission’s primary mandate over administration of elections. 
 
Since the results of the elections were announced, there have been a number of 
election petitions. The first was brought by the Mgwirizano coalition of opposition 
political parties. Their main argument was that the electoral process had been marred 
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by so many irregularities that the outcome announced by the Electoral Commission 
was not a fair reflection of the wishes of the electorate. This case is on-going and, 
therefore, little can be said about its broad impact on the electoral process, except that 
it served a useful safetyvalve function by assuring Mgwirizano supporters that their 
grievances would be handled by the courts. This dissipated the tensions that had been 
so high and had erupted into violence in some areas of Blantyre soon after the 
announcement of the results by the Electoral Commission. 
 
In addition to the petition by Mgwirizano, a number of other petitions have also been 
filed with the High Court since the results were announced. They include complaints 
by candidates of the various parties complaining that the electoral process had not 
been free and fair.53 Below is an indication of some of the petitions before the High 
Court by 24 June 2004. 
 
CANDIDATE CONSTITUENCY AFFILIATION 
Margaret Mbilizi Blantyre Malabada UDF 
Ken Ng’oma Lilongwe Kumachenga UDF 
Salim Bagus Chikwawa central UDF 
Ibrahim Mdala Zomba Malosa Independent 
Frezza Nihorya Mulanje Limbuli Independent 
Ephraim Kachingwe Blantyre  
Catherine Gothari Hara 
Mkandawire 
Mzimba West UDF 
 
The petitions mentioned above serve various functions. In the first place, they seek to 
make the Electoral Commission and other election-related institutions accountable 
and contribute to setting standards for future elections. They also act as a face-saving 
exit strategy by candidates who genuinely lost the elections. And, lastly, but not least 
important, they present disgruntled supporters of the candidates an outlet for their 
frustration and dissatisfaction with the process.  
 
In most of the cases judgement is still outstanding, but on 10 November the High 
Court, sitting in Mzuzu, passed judgment in the last of the cases listed above. In the 
ruling, the court nullified the results for the Mzimba West constituency, where the 
former Deputy Speaker of Paliament Loveness Gondwe’s was elected. The court 
found proof of gross anomalies during the election process, including irregular 
campaigning on election day and use of a parliamentary vehicle during the campaign 
period.54 Whether the ruling will be appealed, and if so, whether this will be the final 
outcome of the case, remains to be seen. 
Assessing the political role of the courts 
As we have seen, the political role of the courts in Malawian politics became 
significant and has gradually expanded since the on-set of the transition in the early 
1990s. The new political role of the judiciary was played in the form of arbitration of 
                                                 
53 For example, see Ng’oma v Chikhadwe and Electoral Commission and Gaffar v Kadzamira and 
Electoral Commission Miscellaneous Application No. 22 of 2004 
54 This is the facts as they are reported in the Nation on 10 November 2004. See 
www.nationmalawi.com/articles.asp?articleID=9321  
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disputes involving institutions involved in the political process, in general, and 
elections in particular. Between 1993 and 2003, the courts intervened in cases 
involving the President, Ministers, Parliament, individual Members of Parliament, 
political parties, the Electoral Commission, the police and the state broadcaster, the 
Malawi Broadcasting Corporation. In the 2004 elections, the judiciary played a more 
interventionist role at every stage of the process than they had done in the 1994 or 
1999 elections. They intervened at new stages in the process and were more willing to 
adjudicate in internal matters of political parties. In 1994, most of the significant 
interventions emerged in relation to the legal framework and the polling itself. In 
1999, the courts intervened at the campaign stage, while in 2004 the courts also 
intervened at the political party registration and candidate-selection stages, and sought 
to enforce accountability in relation to internal disputes of institutions such as political 
parties. In most of the cases, the courts authority was accepted and they were able to 
enforce accountability and compliance with the rules, and act as a safety valve and 
internal arbiter of various political disputes. In general, therefore, the courts made a 
positive contribution to the democratisation process in Malawi, constraining abuse of 
power and promoting democratic principles. 
 
We hasten to add that lack of accountable government remains a great problem in 
Malawi, and that the quality of the democratic process has deteriorated in some 
respects. The 2004 elections were far from flawless – the playing field was not level 
and the integrity of the results in some cases doubtful.55 In this perspective the courts 
in Malawi can be said to have failed to secure accountability to the rules and “unblock 
the democratic channels”. However, despite examples of cases where the courts from 
a democratic perspective could – and possibly should – have ruled differently, they 
have played a central role and made positive contributions throughout the democratic 
period, and have undoubtedly assumed a significant accountability function. It is thus 
appropriate to ask: Why did this happen? What enabled the courts to emerge from 
their subordinate position during one-party era, to start acting as an institutional 
constraint on government? 
Underpinnings of the Malawian courts accountability function 
In order to understand why the courts in Malawi has come to occupy such a central 
role in the political process, and has managed to establish a significant accountability 
function vis-à-vis the government, it is important both to look at what has prevented the 
government from reigning in the judiciary, what has motivates judges to take up such a 
role, and what has motivated the parties to lodge political cases in the courts.  
 
We start by asking: What has prevented the government from controlling the Malawian 
judiciary? 
 
Our assumption is that the following five factors are of key importance in order for 
judiciaries to establish and maintain their independence: 56 
                                                 
55 Observers described it as ”free but not fair” and as more lacking in terms of electoral administration 
and a level playing field than the two previous elections (whthe the 1994 elections being described as 
”free and fair” and the 1999 elections ”substatially free and fair”. The lack of a level playing field is 
most strikingly reflected in the reports from the Media Monitoring Unit referred to above. 
56 See also Gloppen et al. (2004). The growing theoretical literature on judicial accountability includes 
Mark Ramseyer (1994), “The Puzzling (In)dependence of the Courts: A Comparative Approach,” 
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· The formal constitutional mandate that the courts operate within, determining the 
width of their mandate and the extent of their powers 
· The arrangements in place to provide the judiciary with structural independence 
from the political branches (appointment procedures, procedures for 
promoting, disciplining and removing judges, security of tenure, remuneration, 
budgets) 
· The resources available for the courts (infrastructure, staff,  running costs, 
training, legal material) determines their ability to effectively process cases 
and deliver judgements.  
· The professional competence of the judiciary, the personal and professional 
qualities of the judges on the bench (which is related to recruitment patterns, 
education and training – and the existence of professional forums that 
establishes professional standards and makes professional reputation matter.) 
· And, last, but not least, the extent to which the courts have protective 
constituencies that make it costly for the government to encroach on their 
independence.57 (Either due to their general legitimacy in society or to support 
from politically significant groups, such as business or donors)  
 
By systematically investigating these factors, we may gain an understanding of the 
conditions under which judges operate and their possibilities for assessing their 
independence vis-à-vis other political bodies, but not why they choose to act on it. So, 
we need to ask: What motivates Malawian judges to establish the judiciary as an 
independent institution holding political power holders to account?  
 
Our assumption is that the motivation for judges to establish and maintain their 
independence in the face of government pressure depend on:  
· Their ethical standards – the norms of professionalism in the legal community 
and their judges perception of their own role  
· The opportunity structures open to the judges (what they gain/stand to loose 
from acting contrary to the government versus supporting it) 
· The predictability of the political context (in particular the ability to calculate 
who will be in power after the next election).58 
 
Since the legal system in Malawi is litigation- or lawyer-driven, in the sense that the 
judges can only pronounce on cases placed before them, and not take up cases on their 
own initiative, we also need to understand why cases are brought to the court. What 
motivates the various actors on the political scene in Malawi to make use of the courts to 
further their aims?  
                                                                                                                                            
Journal of Legal Studies 23 (June) pp. 721-748; Peter H. Russell and David M. O’Brien, eds. (2001), 
Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World 
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia); Steven B. Burbank and Barry Friedman (2002) 
Judicial independence at the crossroads : an interdisciplinary approach. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications; and Andrâs  Sâjo, A. and Lorri R. Bentch (2004) Judicial integrity . Leiden ; Boston, 
Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
57 On this see also Widner, J (1999) “Building Judicial Independence in Common Law Africa,” in A. 
Schedler et al. eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), 180. and Widner, J. A. (2001). Building the Rule of Law, W.W. Norton 
& Company. 
58 See Peter VanDoepp (2003) “The Problem of Judicial Control in Africa’s Neopatrimonial 
Democracies:Malawi and Zambia in Comparative View” (forthcoming in Political Science Quarterly). 
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We assume that the motivation for using the courts to resolve political matters, rather 
than concentrating energy and resources on fighting out contentious matters 
politically (or by other means), depend on: 
· Prevailing norms regarding which matters fall within the scope of judicial 
authority.  
· The costs of litigation (financial and in terms of time) versus the potential 
benefits 
· The trust in the judiciary relative to other institutions (whether potential litigants 
may expect to get a fair hearing) 
· The accessibility of other institutions for resolving disputes and for holding 
political power-holders accountable) 
 
To investigate each of these dynamics in detail, looking at developments over time, 
go beyond the scope of this paper, but we will use the framework to highlight some 
important factors. 
 
What has prevented (more extensive) government control of the judiciary? 
Several of the factors assumed to be important for the ability of the government to 
control the judiciary, were altered radically at the time of the democratic transition in 
Malawi.  
Formal constitutional mandate 
A most important factor is that 1994 Constitution provides the courts with a broad 
mandate and extensive powers of judicial review. The judiciary has the responsibility 
of “interpreting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution and all laws in accordance 
with the Constitution in an independent and impartial manner with regard only to 
relevant facts and prescriptions of law”59 Any apparent narrowness of the mandate 
that this section may suggest is compensated for by other sections which suggest a 
broader mandate for the judiciary which allows it to resolve political questions. 
Section 11(2)(a) of the Constitution provides that in interpreting the Constitution, courts 
must promote “the values which underlie an open and democratic society”. Obviously, 
such values are political and require the judge to know them and consciously promote 
them.  
 
The Constitution mandates the judiciary to take full account of the"underlying 
principles" and the "principles of national policy" in the interpretation of any of its 
provisions.60 The mandate of the judiciary to engage actively in the political process 
is further reinforced by constitutional provisions which declare that the Constitution – 
whose interpretation is the preserve of the judiciary- is the supreme arbiter, not only 
in the interpretation of all laws, but also “the resolution of political disputes” 
(emphasis supplied).61 
 
The Constitution gives a broad and explicit “accountability-mandate” to the judiciary 
not only by expressly authorising it to resolve political disputes, in accordance with 
democratic values, but also by giving courts specific powers that enable them to hold 
to account individuals and public and private institutions. The Constitution gives the 
                                                 
59 Section 9. 
60 Sections 11(2)(b). 
61 Section 10(1). 
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judiciary wide powers of deciding for itself the scope of matters that it can handle, 
giving the courts the power to determine all issues of a judicial nature and the power 
to decide whether any particular issue is of a judicial nature.62 More to the point, the 
Constitution grants the High Court the authority and power to enforce accountability 
by providing that “the High Court has jurisdiction to review any law and any action or 
decision of the Government in addition to any other powers that may be conferred by 
the Constitution or any other law”.63 
 
No doubt then, the Malawian judiciary has a sound formal basis for adjudicating 
political disputes and asserting its authority over other arms of government. 
Structural independence  
In Malawi the institutional protection of judicial independence improved with the 
restructuring of the legal system that accompanied the transition from a one party 
dictatorship to a pluralistic constitutional democracy in the early 1990s. In the one-
party state, judicial power had been vested in two sets of institutions. One system was 
based on the English legal system and had a judiciary consisting of Subordinate 
Courts, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. These courts enjoyed a fair 
amount of structural independence. However, their jurisdiction was increasingly 
restricted to non-political cases. The other set of legal institutions – the Traditional 
Courts – were loosely based on indigenous customary laws. These courts were not 
structurally independent. They operated under the control of the Minister of Justice. In 
the early 1970s, the upper echelons of the traditional courts were given power to try 
serious crimes including murder, treason and sedition. This enabled the state to get its 
will, but with hindsight probably contributed to the legitimacy of the current judiciary, 
by relieving the common law courts of the most politically tainting cases under the 
one-party regime.  
 
The 1994 Constitution integrated the lower grades of Traditional Courts64 into the 
English-based judicial system and dissolved the higher-level courts, thereby 
strengthening the structural independence of the judiciary as a whole. The 1994 
Constitution also explicitly requires that judicial power must be exercised 
“independently of the influence and direction of any other person or authority”, 65 and 
provides structural mechanisms to insulate the judiciary from undue political 
influence in the form of special procedures for appointment of judges, security for 
tenure and conditions of service. Structural independence is strengthened by self-
regulation in matters of promotion and discipline which fall under the Judicial Service 
Commission. 66  
 
                                                 
62 Section 103(2). 
63 Section 108(2). 
64 That is, the Regional Traditional Courts and National Traditional Appeal Court. In the integrated 
system, the highest court is the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal, below which is the High Court, 
followed by Magistrates’ Courts. 
65 Section 103(1). 
66 Independence does not negate accountability. Thus, the judiciary is also subject to constitutional 
oversight by other institutions, the most important of which is Parliament and the President who acting 
in concert may effect the removal of a judge from office using the impeachment procedure outlined in 
Section 119 of the Constitution.
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Still, there is significant scope for executive influence, both in the appointment 
process and in the 'reward and punishment' structure.67 A number of stakeholders 
interviewed expressed the view that the appointment powers of the President limit the 
objectivity and independence of the process of selecting judicial officers. The 
executive retains considerable influence over appointments – particularly of High-
Court judges, as well as over selection of judges to attractive and lucrative positions, 
such as commission chairs. The appointment process is open to manipulation that can 
undermine judicial independence because it lacks adequate scrutiny by the public and 
is predominated by powers of the President.68 There is no public participation in the 
work of the Judicial Service Commission. Some see the lack of public participation in 
the selection of judicial officers and their appointment as a factor that threatens 
judicial independence – and the legitimacy of the judiciary – in Malawi.69 Some 
academic commentators have also made similar observations.70 Overall, though, our 
interviews with central stakeholders indicate that the judiciary was regarded as 
predominantly independent despite the concerns about the lack of independence and 
transparency of the appointments process. 
 
The powers of Parliament and the President to impeach judges under section 119 of 
the Constitution can also be abused to undermine the structural independence of the 
judiciary. 71 This was arguably the case in 2001 when Parliament passed a motion for 
                                                 
67 The selection of judges of the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal is open to criticism for not 
being sufficiently objective and transparent. Objectivity is limited mainly because the President has an 
undue influence on the process. The President appoints High Court and Supreme Court judges. He 
consults the Judicial Service Commission but they only make non-binding recommendations to him or 
her. In any case, members of the Judicial Service Commission are themselves appointed by the 
President. The power to appoint members of the Judicial Service Commission enhances the President’s 
ability to determine the composition of the courts. 
68 Although in matters of internal regulation, the judiciary enjoys substantial structural independence, 
in terms of appointment, that independence can easily be subverted because transparency is virtually 
non-existent in the judicial appointment process. Vacancies are advertised widely but the names of 
applicants for judicial office are not made public, neither are the reasons for the final selection. Given 
that the Judicial Service Commission does  not have members of the public or their representatives, the 
absence of publication of information about the process shields it from public or other external 
scrutiny. At best, this makes it easy for some people to allege that the selection is based on irrelevant 
considerations. At worst, it conveniently conceals the actual political manipulation of the judicial 
process through strategic appointment or exclusion of particular individuals, that actually takes place 
behind the veil of confidentiality. 
69 The latest appointments to the High Court bench did, in fact, cause some controversy when one of 
the applicants for appointment who had not been appointed suggested that he had been left out only 
because he came from the Northern Region of the country, and commenced legal proceedings against 
the Judicial Service Commission alleging bias. The case had not been concluded at the time of writing 
this report. 
70 For example, see P. Mutharika, “The 1995 Democratic Constitution of Malawi” [1996] Journal of 
African Law 205-219, 215-216; W. Dodge et. al., A Commentary on the Provisional Constitution of 
Malawi (Washington D.C. 1994), F. Kanyongolo, “Human Rights in Polarised Societies: A 
Comparative Analysis of Malawi and South Africa”, PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1999. 
71 The Constitution provides that a judge of the High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal may be 
removed from office only on two grounds: incompetence in the performance of the duties of his or her 
office or for misbehaviour. The tenure of judges is further secured by the constitutional provision that 
requires the removal of judges to be done in accordance with an elaborate procedure that protects the 
judge against unjustified or unfair removal from office. The President has the power to remove a judge 
from office after consulting the Judicial Service Commission. However, this is permitted only where 
the National Assembly has submitted a petition to the President seeking the removal of the judge. Such 
petition must be preceded by a debate in the National Assembly on the proposal to remove the judge 
  26 
the impeachment of three High Court judges on questionable allegations of 
incompetence and misbehaviour. In the event, the President did not remove the judges 
from office not least because there was an outcry from local and international civil 
society organisations and donors. The attempt to remove the judges can partly be 
understood by seeing it as a reaction by Parliament to what it perceived as the 
judiciary’s encroachment into parliamentary business in the various cases of judicial 
review in which the courts asserted a review power over decisions made by 
Parliament.72 Interestingly, both members of the judiciary and externa l observers and 
stakeholders indicate the Malawian judiciary emerged stronger from this ‘crisis’. As 
one of the judges who had been subjected to impeachment said “we received support 
from the general public, from churches, NGOs and international donors, so we felt 
quite secure”. 73 
Professional competence 
While structural independence is important, it is certainly no guarantee of judicial 
independence. There is ample evidence of independent minded judges in contexts 
where the structural conditions for independence are weak – and of executive minded 
judges in conditions where the judiciary enjoy excellent insulation from political 
interference. The personal integrity and attitude of the judges are always a crucial 
factor, but the legal culture, and level of professionalism in the judiciary is also of key 
importance. The judiciary is more likely to take on a role as guardians of the 
constitution and its democratic values where the judiciary has a degree of 
professionalism, and where judicial independence is among the standards set for 
professional conduct by the legal culture.  
 
In Malawi, the judges from the one-party era remained on the bench after the 
ascendancy into power of the democratically elected government in 1994  (although 
this situation would over time change with an increasing number of new appointees). 
It might be expected that such judges would have been socialised into a pliant 
judiciary that was not independent of the executive branch of government and would 
continue to reflect this in the new dispensation. However, as noted earlier, the 
judiciary in Malawi – due to their politically marginalised status – retained a measure 
of independence and professionalism even under the one-party era. 
 
Most stakeholders interviewed and most literature reviewed indicated that the 
judiciary is currently perceived as being, by and large, independent and professional. 
Nevertheless, some pointed out the need to further improve on professionalism by 
exposing judges to specialised training. In this connection, the judiciary indicated that 
it had plans to establish a Judicial Training Institute which will “provide training in 
judicial work, judicial administration, staff development, operational needs and 
                                                                                                                                            
and can only be submitted to the President if it is passed by a majority of the votes of all the members 
of the Assembly. The Constitution requires that the removal of a judge must also abide by the 
principles of natural justice. The elaborate procedure laid down by section 119 is deliberately intended 
to guard against whimsical and arbitrary removal of judges from office: the grounds for removal are 
restricted to incompetence and misbehaviour, there are least three institutions involved in the process 
and the procedure must accord with principles of natural justice. 
72 For a more detailed discussion of the impeachment process see van Doepp (2003). 
73 Interview with authors, July 2004. The lack of support from within the judicary and the Malawian 
legal community was, however, critizised, and the need to set up procedures for handeling these types 
of cases, were underscored – but no such process has been intiated so far.  
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reform initiatives.”74 Training initiatives for judges from several countries in the 
region were discussed. 
 
Obviously, the ability to build and sustain capacity and competence in the judiciary as 
an institution as well as that of individual judges also depend on the resources at their 
disposal. It is, therefore, important to consider the availability of resources in the 
judiciary.  
Resources  
The availability – and predictability – of resources (for infrastructure, staff, running 
cost, library resources, training etc.) are crucial for courts' ability to build the capacity 
to fulfil an accountability function. But while important, resources in itself may be of 
little use without the institutional will and administrative ability (including technical 
support) to turn use them to build the required institutional strength. 
 
An assessment by the United Nations Development Programme in 2001 concluded 
that by and large, the judiciary had demonstrated independence but that “judicial 
independence faces a threat from financial dependence on the Executive and the 
Legislature”.75 It must also be pointed out, though, that in the past two years, some 
measures have been taken to enhance the financial autonomy of the courts. Most 
notable in this regard was the enactment of the Judicature Administration Act which, 
inter alia, authorises the judiciary to retain any money that court users pay in the form 
of fees and other payments. The demand for financial autonomy had been made by 
the judiciary for over ten years before it was finally enacted into law. 76 In its strategies 
for the period 2003 to 2008, the judiciary plans to secure that financial independence 
by, among other things, establishing “direct reporting by the Chief Justice to 
Parliament for all budgetary matters”. 77  
 
The judiciary’s own assessment of the situation in the Malawi Judiciary Development 
Programme 2003-2008 is that: “Inadequate provision of fundamental legal resources, 
such as books, case reports, statute books and gazettes, greatly constrains the 
performance of the judiciary in its administration of justice.” But, although the  
judiciary does not have adequate resources, its situation must be placed within the 
broader context of the national economy. From that perspective, some argue that the 
judiciary is relatively better off than other public institutions,78 while others, 
comparing conditions in the courts with those of the civil service, conclude that the 
judiciary is being starved of funds.79  
                                                 
74 Malawi Judiciary Development Programme 2003/11-2008/10, p. 15. 
75 United Nations System in Malawi, Common Country Assessment of Malawi: 2001 Report 
(Liilongwe, 2001) 
76 Following a Seminar on Judicial Administration organised in August 1993 by the Magistrates and 
Judges Association of Malawi, partic ipants observed that: “for the better dispensation of justice, the 
government should provide [human, financial and other] resources adequately to the judiciary and 
[such resources] should be independently controlled by the judiciary”.76 (my italics) 
77 Malawi Judiciary Development Programme 2003-2008, p. 18. 
78 This view is shared by United Nations agencies in the country who have observed that: “the shortage 
of funds is a problem faced by all branches of government and the financial constraints experienced by 
the judiciary should not be construed as intended to prejudice the courts.” (United Nations System in 
Malawi, Common Country Assessment of Malawi: 2001 Report, p. 31.) 
79 Personal communication with Justice Ministry official. 
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In Malawi, the higher judiciary (at the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
level) – where the political cases are handled – has been relatively successful both 
with regard to secure funds, and in transforming them into institutional strength. 
Political cases in particular are disposed of swiftly. In the lower courts the situation is 
very different, with few resources and huge backlogs. This is disturbing with regard to 
another important factor underpinning an independent judiciary, namely the social 
legitimacy of the institution. 
Legitimacy and 'protective constituencies' 
People are motivated to refer their disputes to certain institutions, partly because they 
trust that its decisions are likely to be enforced. This is particularly the case where 
decisions are made against the government. In such cases, one critical factor that 
determines the enforcement of the court’s decisions is the willingness of the 
government to comply with court decisions. The government's willingness to accept 
adverse judgements by the courts, depend to a large extent on whether the courts have 
secure social basis. If the judiciary has the trust and backing of important 
constituencies, it becomes costly for the government to ignore or override 
unfavourable judgments. If the weakness of the lower judiciary means that the formal 
courts system is irrelevant to the lives of most people, this may weaken the ability of 
the higher courts to stand up against the government.  
 
In Malawi there are important constituencies backing the courts and their 
accountability function. In terms of popular support, the churches are probably the 
most significant. The churches (most prominently the Catholic Church) have been 
consistent and outspoken in their support for democratic ideals and the courts as 
institutions to safeguard citizens' rights. Another factor is that almost all actors on the 
political scene regularly turn to the courts. This indicates a measure of trust in the 
institution among political elites, which is a crucial resource. And, lastly, but of 
central importance: support from donors and the international community is an 
important resource for the judiciary. International recognition depends on being seen 
to respect the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. This is of particular 
relevance for donor dependent countries like Malawi. Signals that encroachment on 
judicial independence may have negative consequences for the dispersing of funds (as 
happened in relation to the impeachment proceedings against three High Court 
Judges) may act as a deterrent against the most blatant strategies to constrain judicial 
independence. 
 
Combined, these factors may explain why the Malawian government has not to a 
greater extent managed to escape the control of the judiciary. But we also need to 
understand the Judges motivation for taking on such a role. As the theoretical 
framework outlined above indicate, we assume that judges are led by a combination 
of normative considerations (a desire to be good judges) and strategic considerations 
(furthering their own career opportunities).  
 
Given that most of the current judges were appointed – and all of them trained – in the 
one-party era, one might expect the professional norms and standards of judicial 
behaviour to be predominantly deferential and executive minded, and detrimental to 
the emergence of an assertive judiciary holding the government to account. However, 
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while there are compliant judges, this do not characterized the Malawian judiciary as 
a whole. And several judges express strong views on judicial independence. Why is 
this so? In this context the Banda administration’s marginalisation of the common law 
courts – shielding them as it were from politically sensitive cases – seems to have 
been conducive in this regard, in the sense that within their confined jurisdiction, the 
courts maintained professional standards and independence.80 That about half of the 
judges have studied outside the country (mainly in Britain, and some in the US) and 
more have been abroad for shorter periods of training, may also have shaped the 
norms of appropriateness within the judiciary in a more liberal direction. 81 Given the 
small size of the judiciary, individuals also matter, and it has probably made a 
difference that certain influential judges have flagged strong views on judicial 
independence, both in their judgements and in other forums. Last, but not least, the 
constitution itself established new standards for judicial behaviour and an explicit 
accountability mandate. This is highly significant as it meant that also from a 
conservative, legal positivist perspective it is legitimate for the courts to overrule the 
political branches. In sum, although there are differences within the legal community, 
the legal norms of the Malawian judiciary seem to be relatively conducive to the 
development of an assertive role vis-à-vis the political institutions.  
 
What about the judges personal incentives? On the one hand, there are the personal 
incentives (carrots as well as sticks) that the government may make use of use to get 
compliant judges. These may be legal (such as expectations of appointment to 
lucrative positions), in a grey zone (such as concerns for family business interests), or 
illegal (threats or “money changing hands”). But there are also incentives for 
maintaining an independent stance. For one, it is a matter of recognition in the legal 
community and the broader public. For ambitious Malawian judges, who may see 
international careers as an attractive option, a record of independence is a great asset. 
And, thirdly, and perhaps most important, in an unpredictable political situation, 
where it possible or likely that there will be a shift in power, the safest bet for 
strategic minded judges, may actually be to maintain an independent, neutral, stance.82 
Thus, given the political context in Malawi there are good reason for judges to signal 
their independence, particularly in the run-up to an election where the outcome of the 
contest is open, as in the recent elections. 
 
We have now indicated possible factors explaining why the government in Malawi 
has not been able to completely control the courts, and why (some of) the judges have 
opted for a politically assertive role. It remains, however, to look at factors that may 
explain why the parties choose to use the courts – despite the costs of litigation – 
rather than other arenas to fight out their disputes.  
 
Several informants have noted that the “winner take all” nature of judicial decisions 
are favoured by the political elites in Malawi – there seems to be a perception that it is 
better to have the courts settle matters once and for all than to go on negotiating and 
                                                 
80 According to some informants, resentment against the way the courts were sidelined in the Banda, 
era also created a desire to get back into a more prominent role. 
81 Although the British legal tradition itself is built around a principle of parliamentary rather than 
constitutional supremacy. 
82 See also von Doepp (2003). 
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compromising politically.83 That people with legal training figure prominently on the 
political scene in Malawi may have affected perceptions of which matters that belong 
in the courts, versus in the political domain, thus driving litigation.  
 
Litigation is costly, in Malawi as elsewhere, good lawyers are very expensive, but this 
does not seem to deter parties from taking cases to the courts.84 One reason may be 
that the costs are small relative to the potential economic benefits from gaining 
political office. Another factor may be that the legal route in many cases may be 
perceived as quicker and more reliable. The courts in Malawi have also been 
relatively quick in resolving political cases – and in particular with regard to the 
urgent applications that often arise in the election process, they may provide ‘instant 
relief’. Although the issue of cost is relatively minor to most of the litigants that have 
taken cases to court, it is a crucial one in relation to the broader population. While 
political parties and NGOs can easily afford the costs of litigation, the average 
Malawian voter cannot. This is probably the reason why among the elections cases 
decided since 1994, none was commenced by a typical Malawian voter who lives in 
the rural areas below the poverty line. 
 
However, the main factor explaining the extent to which political cases are taken to 
court in Malawi is probably the level of trust in the judiciary relative to other 
institutions. During the past decade, the courts have built a record of independence 
(although not untainted), and even those who express doubt in the independence of 
the judiciary will take cases to court and expect to get a fair hearing. Sometimes the 
reason given is that there are no real alternatives, the representative institutions – 
parties, parliament – are not seen as viable routes to go. In this sense the centrality of 
the judiciary in Malawian politics should be seen both as a result of developments in 
the courts themselves, and as a consequence of the weakness of the vertical channels 
for holding government to account. 
Concluding remarks  
In this paper we have aimed to describe the nature and extent of the role played by the 
courts in Malawian politics in the context of the 2004 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. We have also sought to explain why the courts have come to occupy such a 
central position on the political scene in Malawi, looking at the recent history, as well 
as factors that explain why it has been difficult for the government to fully control the 
courts; what has motivated the judges to assume a political role; and what motivates 
the parties to bring political disputes to the courts.  
 
We have shown that the courts have been involved at every stage of the process, 
interacting with the various stakeholders (the Electoral Commission, political parties, 
the Executive, Parliament). In doing so, the judiciary has assumed four politically 
significant functions:  
 
                                                 
83 Other informants disputed this view, holding that adversarial conflict resolution is alien to Malawian 
culture.  
84 According to some of the lawyers interviewed, the political parties were bad clients in terms of 
paying for services rendered, but good for business in the sense that high-profile political cases gave 
opportunities for positive exposure – particularly if the litigation was successful. 
  31 
On several occasions the judiciary has taken on an accountability function–- sanctioning 
violations of electoral rules and broader democratic principles; acting to hinder self-
serving alterations of the legal and institutional framework for the elections and 
preserve space for actors in political and civil society to perform a meaningful role in 
the electoral process.  
 
The courts have also functioned as a safety -valve at various stages of the electoral 
process. They have diffused tension, for example when electoral results are disputed, 
by providing an arena where the contesting parties can fight out their battles through 
their lawyers, after a cool-off period. In such cases, the courts also provide the losing 
parties with a face-saving option, they can use strong rhetoric and be seen to “do 
something”, and subsequently let the case fizzle out and die, outside the public eye.  
 
In the 2004 elections, the courts also took on a new role, namely that of an internal 
arbiter in intra-party disputes. A large number of disputes regarding the parties’ 
selection of candidates went to the courts.85 The courts do not have a clear legal basis 
for holding party leadership accountable to party- internal procedures for candidate 
selection. Still, there were few questions as to whether it is legitimate or prudent for 
the courts to adjudicate in these cases, which previously and in other countries are 
handled internally by party structures, and this seems to reflect a lack of legitimate 
and trustworthy mechanisms for dispute resolution within the parties.  
 
Lastly, we have shown that different actors on the political scene in Malawi have used 
the courts to increase their political leverage. Criminal cases involving allegations of 
forgery, murder and treason (and threats of laying such charges) have been used by 
the government to discredit political opponents and as a means to persuade them into 
cooperation. While opposition parties have used court challenges (election petitions) 
as bargaining chips, withdrawing the case in return for cabinet positions. 
 
The four roles that the courts have been cast in during the 2004 electoral process are 
all highly significant, affecting the nature of electoral politics in Malawi. But from the 
perspective of democratic consolidation and the integrity of the electoral process, the 
effects are ambiguous. While the accountability function is crucial from a democratic 
perspective, and the safety valve function is conducive to social peace in a situation 
where the political institutions are weak, the role of intra-party arbiter is more 
problematic. It may render the courts vulnerable to politicisation and also seems to 
contribute to the tendency of turning political disputes into matters of monetary 
compensation for individuals. The courts’ role in creating political leverage for the 
parties and individual candidates is in many instances directly anti-democratic in 
nature, undermining the influence of the voters and the vertical accountability 
relationships of the political system.  
 
A main negative consequence of the judiciary’s increased political involvement is that 
it may be (and to some extent already has come to be) identified with particular vested 
interests, as various contestants in the political arena seek ways of controlling the 
judiciary in order to exploit its power for political gain. The critical challenge of any 
judiciary in this situation is to sustain its accountability function and institutional 
independence. In Malawi, courts have generally managed to sustain their 
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independence and, therefore, been able to perform a significant accountability 
function. However, if the courts maintain – or continue to increase – their 
involvement in the political process, it is likely that the judiciary increasingly will be 
perceived as politically biased. 
 
So while the Malawian courts have demonstrated a considerable degree of 
independence throughout the election period, and beyond doubt have contributed 
positively to the electoral process, there are also worrying signs. 
 
 
  
 
Summary 
The courts in Malawi have played a prominent role in political 
life since the democratic transition in 1993, which came about 
after three decades of repressive authoritatian rule. Whilst the 
quality of electoral politics have deteriorated, the courts have 
become increasingly central. In the 2004 elections they were 
involved at every stage of the election process. In this paper we 
argue that the Malawian judiciary has assumed four politically 
significant functions in the electoral process: it performs an 
accountability function, acts as a safety-valve, plays the role of 
an internal arbiter for the political parties; and functions as a 
source of political leverage. Furthermore, we argue that in 
order to understand this increasing politicisation of Malawian 
politics, it is important both to look at what has prevented the 
government from reigning in the judiciary, what has motivated 
judges to take up such a role, and what has motivated the 
parties to lodge political cases in the courts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0804-3639 
ISBN 82-8062-101-6 
 
  
 
 
Recent Working Papers 
 
 
WP 2004: 15 OVERÅ, Ragnhild 
Networks, distance and trust: Telecommunications and changing trading practices in 
Ghana. Bergen, 2004. 
WP 2004:14 KNUDSEN, Are 
Crescent and sword:The Hamas enigma. Bergen, 2004, 16 pp. 
WP 2004:13 VILLANGER, Espen and Anette Enes 
The role of participation and empowerment in income and poverty dynamics in 
Indonesia 1993-2000. Bergen, 2004, 30 pp. 
WP 2004: 12 VILLANGER, Espen 
Poweful donors and foreign policy: The role of multilateral financial institutions. 
Bergen, 2004, 22 pp. 
WP 2004: 11 TJØNNELAND, Elling 
Norway and the NGO Channel. The Case of South Africa. Bergen 2004, 14 pp. 
WP 2004: 10 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge 
   Decentralisation and corruption. A review of the literature. Bergen, 2004, 35 pp. 
WP 2004-9 KOLSTAD, Ivar og Espen Villanger 
   Decentralisation and corruption. A review of the literature. Bergen, 2004, 31 pp. 
WP 2004:8 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge 
To pay or not to pay? Citizens’ views on taxation in local authorities in Tanzania. 
Bergen, 2004, 25 pp. 
WP 2004:7 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge 
Local government finances and financial management in Tanzania. Bergen, 2004, 31 
pp. 
WP 2004: 6 WIIG, Arne 
 Risk and dis intermediation in tourism. Bergen, 2004, 19 pp. 
WP 2004: 5 TOSTENSEN, Arne 
Towards feasible social security systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Bergen, 2004, 14 pp. 
WP 2004: 4  TOSTENSEN, Arne 
Rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa: Contemporary debates and 
implications for Kenyan urban workers in the 21st century. Bergen, 2004, 13 pp. 
WP 2004: 3 KOLSTAD, Ivar 
What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions. Bergen, 2004, 
25 pp. 
WP 2004: 2 KOLSTAD, Ivar and Espen Villanger 
 Determinants of foreign direct investment in services. Bergen, 2004, 25 pp. 
WP 2004: 1 KNUDSEN, Are 
 License to kill. Honour killings in Pakistan. Bergen, 2004. 
WP 2003: 13 RAKNER, Lise 
 Uncertainty as a strategy: Electoral processes in Zambia 1991-2001. Bergen, 2003, 21 pp. 
WP 2003:12 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge 
 What has trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges in local authorities in South 
Africa. Bergen, 2003, 26 pp. 
WP 2003:11 BJORVATN, Kjetil and Carsten Eckel 
 Winners and losers from an international investment agreement. Bergen, 2003, 20 pp. 
WP 2003:10 KNUDSEN, Are 
 Islamism in the diaspora : Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Bergen, 2003, 23 pp. 
 
 
 
CMI’s publications, Annual Report and quarterly newsletters are available on CMI’s homepage 
www.cmi.no. 
 
 
